Afghanistan stays at a crossroads, facing two possible futures: indefinite violent conflict and worse, gradual progress towards sustainable peace and progress. Decisions made now based on strategy, tactics, and resources can tip the balance either way.
Public opinion suggests that the democracy proposed to become applicable in Afghanistan with its western line and length was incompatible with Afghan cultural values, and the extremely low level of public awareness about democracy was among the major causes of the failure of democracy in Afghanistan.
The Kabul Administration, dominated by warlords and pro-west elements, rather than offering Afghan citizens opportunities to oversee their government efficiently, fostered all kinds of corruption. After twenty years, Afghans were unwilling to fight for a distant government that did not treat them with dignity.
It is better to define the Taliban, as a Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist group, and predominantly Pashto-speaking movement, from the remote areas of the country, having religious beliefs with limited knowledge and a pessimistic approach toward the urbanized civilization.
The Taliban were motivated by the Doha agreement that they would ultimately end the confrontations with U.S. forces, rapidly moved forward, and were closed in on several provincial capitals. By mid-August, the central government had collapsed, and the Taliban had captured the entire country, including the capital, Kabul.
A realistic approach based on ground realities indicates that a large number of civilian casualties by the U.S and NATO forces, widespread corruptionØŒ unjustified Doha agreement, considered as the only “face-saving device” for the U.S escape from Afghanistan, along with other short-comings played a significant role in the U.S. Strategic failure and collapse of its backed Afghan republic.
The justifications occasionally expressed to media by the U.S. administration and previous regime leaders are widespread, and even understandable, but are wrong and garble the mistakes they made during the last two decades. Their policies, as well as their approach to cultural differences, socioeconomic traits, and diversity, are mostly to blame.
Afghanistan stays at a crossroads, facing two possible futures: indefinite violent conflict and worse, gradual progress towards sustainable peace and progress. Decisions made now based on strategy, tactics, and resources can tip the balance either way.
Unluckily, after the U.S. invasion, Taliban leaders were forced to flee to Pakistan. If the world community had not made severe mistakes by laying the wrong foundation for Afghanistan in Bonn, most of the Taliban would have been a central part of the government. Furthermore, the Afghan system and government structure would not have been considered imposed and illegitimate by the people, and most importantly, there wouldn’t have been a chance for insurgency inside Afghanistan. In other words, without the kindling of poor governance, the fire of insurgency would have never been lit.
Historically, during the last five decades, Political leaders, including socialists, Islamists, and Democrats, used either engineered state institutions, patriotic slogans, or religious values to project political gains rather than to govern the country with honesty and dedication based on justice.
During the previous government many women and young people bearing western mentality were appointed to important ministerial and government positions, impressing the United States and NATO partners and signalling young Afghans that they would sideline the warlords, but it never happened.
Afghanistan’s government was utterly corrupt. However, corruption was not part of the Afghan society or culture; it was encouraged by the lack of adequate and applicable policies. Indeed, getting the hearts of the people in Afghanistan does not require massive financial resources, a complicated strategy, and sophisticated armed facilities. It requires treating people with dignity and allowing them to play their due role in their homeland, not only as silent observers.
The Doha agreement energized the Taliban to show strength and expose the Afghan State’s weakness. Moreover, Washington’s inability to adjust and address these factors was considered either; a policy failure or a prefabricated conspiracy for what is going wrong now.
What needs to be done now?
During the last five decades of conflict, the people in Afghanistan have had grievances and accusations regarding the attitude and policies of their neighboring countries towards the insurgency in Afghanistan. However, they don’t believe in adopting a counterproductive measure in response to their bitter behavior, but simply that others should be conscious enough to avoid using chaotic language and threatening tone against Afghanistan and any other country in such a terrifying circumstance.
Their concern is why all of the stakeholders and neighbors are so egocentric that instead of coordinating efforts and collaborating with the people in Afghanistan, initiating collective agenda and focusing mainly on the issues of common interests, each one separately pursues and focuses on matters of their respective concerns. The U.S. government officials seem to be serious about Al Qaida members in Afghanistan, as they consider it the main security threat to the U.S. Moreover, Pakistan mainly focuses on TTP, and China’s concern is ETIM, whereas Iran, Central Asian countries, and Russia are looking for their vested interests.
The Afghans, despite having played no role in providing shelter for the terrorists and extremists, are victims of the world community in barbarous strikes hitting their enemies’ hideouts and are targeted by terrorists as well.
The questions that remained unanswered for the people in Afghanistan are, who directly and indirectly facilitated, trained, equipped, and supported these terrorist groups? Where did they come from? Who motivated them to seek haven in Afghanistan? Why were their hideouts ignored, and unnoticed during the past two decades?
Why their terroristic characteristics are being highly exaggerated and propagated now?
Answering these questions is debatable; hence, to avoid harsh reactions and have more productive encounters with the authorities, it is crucial to face the ground realities and jointly concentrate on the issues of common interests, including the security risks of the neighbours and the global community.
Our neighbours and the world community must make the Taliban’s recognition depending on their reforms in political, security, and social fields. Their recognition should be subject to positive changes in the Taliban’s behavior and policies, and most importantly, the right to education for all must be the most urgent requirement.
A clear message should be delivered to the Taliban that if access to quality education for girls is not allowed, the international community will have to adopt further measures and impose more potential sanctions against them.
Islamic scholars, tribal leaders, and influential political figures should be facilitated to encourage the Taliban to reverse their decision regarding the ban on secondary education and universities for girls and engage with the Taliban to review their destructive policies.
Having no better and workable alternative, the stakeholders should remain engaged in dialogue with the Taliban government and take the religious scholars from Islamic Ummah on board to make the Taliban understand the importance of national and global concerns.
To ensure that the Taliban’s recent policy does not significantly disrupt girls’ learning, international organizations under UN supervision must facilitate girls with adequate online teaching alternatives to continue their studies until the Taliban reopen schools for girls. In international forums, the Taliban claim to have learned from past mistakes and moderated significantly from their earlier extreme policies. However, as the shutdown of girls’ schools shows, their actions are inconsistent with their promises. Almost after two years of their return to power, the regime appears determined to ignore the will of the Afghan people or even display flexibility.
