Matrix Report
Editor’s Note
US generals and politicians never listened to sane advice. This is a deduction from what Vali Reza Nasr, an Iranian-American academic and author specializing in the Middle East and the Islamic world wrote in his book “Reckless Afghan Policy on Afghan Force’s Development.”He quotes in his book the contents of Kayani 3.0, a white paper presented to the White House by Pakistan’s army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in October 2010. The white paper clearly predicted that the US is likely to lose the war along with failing in transforming Afghanistan. It also warned the US against raising a huge army above 300,000 for a poor country like Afghanistan. Kayani recommended to the USA to think for a rational solution to the Afghan crisis. Gen. Kayani reiterated his point of view time and again on different forums at different points of time, to go unnoticed by US stakeholders. Now that America’s failure in war on terror is quite evident, it is time to reconsider Gen. Kayani’s predictions – the way Vali Nasr wrote back in 2010.Below is the page from Nasr’s book.
The drumbeat of skepticism continued. Almost a year later, in October 2010, during the visit of the White House, Pakistan’s army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, gave President Obama a thirteen-page white paper he had written to explain his views on the outstanding strategic issues between Pakistan and the United States. Kayani 3.0, as the paper was dubbed (since it was the 3rd paper Pakistanis gave the White House on the subject), could be summarized as follows: You are not going to win the war, and you are not going to transform Afghanistan. This place has devoured empires before you; it will defy you as well. Stop your grandiose plans and let’s get practical, sit down, and discuss how you will leave and what is an end state we can both live with. Kayani expressed the same doubt time and again in meetings. We would try to convince him (as we did other regional leaders) that we were committed to the region and had a solution for Afghanistan’s problems: we would first beat the Taliban and then build a security force to hold the place together after we left. He, like many others, thought the idea of an Afghan military was foolish and that we were better off negotiating an exit with the Taliban.
In one small meeting around a narrow table, Kayani listened carefully and took notes as we went through our list of issues. I cannot forget Kayani’s reaction when we enthusiastically explained our plan to build up Afghan forces to 400,000 by 2014. His answer was swift and unequivocal: Please don’t try to build that up an army. “You will fail,” he said. “Then you will leave and that half-trained army will break into militias that will be a problem for Pakistan.” We tried to stand our ground, but he would have none of it. He continued, “I don’t believe that the Congress is going to pay nine billion dollars a year for this four-hundred-thousand-man force.” He was sure it would eventually collapse and the fragments of the broken army would resort to crime and terrorism to earn their keep. That after all was pretty much what happened.
