Pakistan’s powerful stakeholders are currently embroiled in an intense debate over the causes of terrorism in Pakistan, groping, it seems, grope for reasons without much introspection and reflection. Instead of looking around, this quest for answers to questions on unabated violence often delves into deflection- a tendency to hide behind external drivers of terrorism that is sweeping the country like never before in a decade.
Officials – used to superficial, knee-jerk responses to situations, miss a simple point; external forces (read ENEMY) only exploit and fuel the fire that is already simmering – sectarian conflicts, popular resentment against socio-economic, sub-nationalist movements, ethnic and ideological discourses rooted in justice.
Triggers only aggravate existing structural factors. It is therefore imperative to dissect the issue in the structural-trigger-factor framework to understand why the TTP is on a relentlessly killing spree. Why is this proxy war – if we agree it is an externally-driven proxy war – not as ferocious in Iran as in Pakistan? Why has proxy terror lost its sting in Xinjiang?
Let us first look at some structural factors that provide the requisite fuel to terrorism and insurgency
Firstly, the foreign policy created space for non-state actors in border provinces as well as Punjab. The authors simply overlooked the fact that these actors will one day grow into monsters and distort the social fabric. TTP, Lashkars, Jaishs, Ahrar, Jhangvis i.a are all the products of that policy framework. Unquestioned support for Afghan and Kashmiri mujahideen has entailed its own hazards.
Secondly, absent, deficient and, or selective rule of law constitutes the most critical structural factor. It is the mother of all factors that define the good or bad of a state. Compromises – such as witnessed in the run-up to the 26th Constitutional Amendment, or the “solidarity” that PPP and PML-N displayed in passing the PECA law – encourage non-state actors to indulge in the same with varying degrees. JUI-F shows its teeth in its own way, while TTP deploys terror to pursue its objectives.
Political expedience is one thing but glossing over violations of laws by religio-political groups and their allies as well as unfair favours to them only encourages disdain for the law. A simple example is the inability or unwillingness to enforce on mosques the Loudspeaker Act and the proliferation of illegally constructed mosques.
Even high-ranking officials mock the law by offering donations to, and prayers at illegally built mosques. The majority ignore the loudspeakers blaring from mosques day and night in residential areas. Pathetically, we can’t control this even in Islamabad.
The distinction of “good or bad” Taliban also flowed from this regime; ironically the good of the past Hafiz Gul Bahadur, for example, turned into a bad Talib and began taking on our security forces. This not only dilutes the law of the land but also paves the way for political blackmail by pampered non-state actors.
Thirdly, the obsolete 19th-century, centralized governance regime that continues to stunt decision implementation. The rapid population growth and the attendant demands have outgrown this system. The obvious result is misgovernance, poor service delivery and exclusion of marginalized groups and regions. This again opens possibilities for the non-state actors to influence and recruit for terror and crime.
Fourth, the perpetual propensity to patronize some mainstream and fringe religious groups
(JUI, JI, MQM,BAP) as well as even notorious warlords in border provinces i.a.) for political management dilutes the state’s soft power i.e. the rule of law. Selective application of the laws invariably breeds resentment and fuels anger among the disenfranchised segments of society. Not surprising if some of them cross over to insurgent groups and this is what has been happening.
Dr.Mahrang Baloch is a case in point; at the moment dominant majority of the Baloch youth follows her blindly. All she is doing is demanding constitutional rights and an equitable share of power and resources for her community. But officials, by branding her a foreign agent, are at best eroding whatever little trust there exists between the Baloch and the state institutions.
The 47-day sit-in Gwadar that was called off on January 30 with another 7-point agreement reflects the same aspirations.
This brings us to the trigger factors that keep aiding the activities of terror and criminal groups.
Though this could also qualify as a structural factor, yet political engineering that has been at play in the country’s political economy also keeps triggering resentment, anger and frustration with the status quo. The common man – and more so the disgruntled youth – looks on in frustration as alleged criminals and the corrupt of the past go on to occupy top positions. And this creates endorsement for the justice narrative that all militant groups use for propaganda and recruitment.
Political compromises out of expedience at the highest level ( the controversy around the 26th Amendment) is a case in point where top state players apparently went back on their commitments and this instigated protests by JUI and its allies.
Secondly, the Blasphemy Laws stand out as one of the serious most trigger factors for violence and harassment ( as of July 2024 nearly 760 sat in prison because of Blasphemy charges).
Thirdly, broken promises ( for example made to ex-FATA residents ) inject anger in vulnerable minds who can easily play into the hands of the insurgents. As the charade against the PTI continues, the so-called newly-merged districts await socio-economic justice through development. Why shouldn’t the anti-state or sub-nationalist groups project this as injustice and injustice?
Fourth, proxy terrorism is linked to big power competition; no militancy can sustain itself unless financed by internal or external sources. The Afghan Taliban succeded because they operated with the support of the communities. The TTP clearly lacks popular support and is at best a proxy group. propped up also by the return of the Afghan Taliban to power. The stalemate in Kurram represents a test case for a state living off compromise after compromise. Why can’t the Sunni groups that occupy lower Kurram areas be subjected to state authority, and what is holding the security forces from enforcing the state’s writ for good? How can small groups of militants be held hostage?
