Often people ask me how was the situation in the northwestern frontier region when I took over as the Commander of the 11thCorps in Feb 2010.
We were well into the operations all over. Some major operations were going on in six (ex-FATA) agencies. Minus North Waziristan, all the agencies were under major operations starting from Bajaur (Operation Sherdil, August 2008), Swat (Rah-e-Rast,May 2009), South Waziristan (Rah-e-Nijat,October 2009) as well as some of the Frontier Regions (FRs) adjacent to ex-FATA agencies. In Swat, we were still busy in minor operations and clearance leading to opening up of areas which were earlier closed or under Taliban threat. Mostly, Taliban had left Swat but there were some locals who were still the sympathizers. So, we were in a sort of major flux of operations and were clearing the areas agency wise.
Complex Nature of Militancy
We were pitched against various groups – which had merged into the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).Swat was under Sufi Muhammad’s Tehreek-e-Nifaze Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), but in reality, it was Mulla Faqeer Mohammad – from Bajaur – led militants’ faction. Khyber was under Haji Mangal Bagh of Lashkar-e-Islam (LI). Mohmand and Orakzai had their own leaders.
Swat was TTP per say, because Sufi Muhammad had a different ideology than the Taliban of Waziristan or those in Kurram and Orakzai, so they had a different thought. Other issue was that FATA was contiguous to Afghanistan. So, there was a supply chain, there was a support base, not necessarily of the sympathizers but of the NDS (Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security) and other agencies operating in Afghanistan. On the contrary, Dir and Bajaur actes as buffers between Swat and Afghanistan.
Swat had a different dimension and Swat (led by Sufi’s son-in-law Mulla Fazlullah) was also leaning on Karakorum Highway (KKH) and the mountainous Hazara region. Therefore, their strategic aim was to sever KKH and cut off the Northern areas from Pakistan; that sort of a game was being played in Swat.
Why did terrorists focus on the Karakorum Highway?
This was the larger agenda of the Taliban. Swat and Northern areas offered them a natural geographically difficult sanctuary. Access is very difficult; the troops were very less at that point of time and we were focused on the Indian border rather than the northwestern areas. Their idea was to get into Northern areas and then connect with the Indians through Kashmir. This is why, it made sense for them to cut off KKH first. As evident, couple of years ago, there was some trouble in Northern areas, most probably externally motivated. The aim was basically to have an alternate support base, in case Afghanistan is not available. So, they sort of looked towards India.
What strategy was plugged-in back then?
We had a parallel strategy going on where as we were developing the capability and the capacity of the law enforcement agencies in settled areas and we remained there in a supporting role. Whereas in the FATA and some other operational areas, we were in the leading role. On the other hand, we were working hand in Glove with KP government and the law enforcement agencies in settled areas while the civilian authorities were hand in glove with us in FATA region. The strategy was to draw some sort of wedge between settled areas and FATA, eventually containing the terrorists. However, the tragedy was confronting some legal implications; someone could just commit a crime in the settled areas and just walk across into FATA, standing there and wave to police – as FATA was not in police’s jurisdiction. Though, we then sent out a clear message that the then KP-FATA boundary was irrelevant for the military and that they would be chased down no matter where they are across the country.
Did Apex Committees assist in curbing terrorism?
Formulating Apex committees was a very good step taken by the then military as well as political leadership to have some synergy.Imagine the governor being the representative of the federation, the chief minister being the chief executive of the province, the military, the Inspector General (IG) Police and the IG Frontier Constabulary (FC); all sitting under one roof and having a debate or a consensual approach towards challenges. If we had not worked on apex committee, probably we would have had to go and knock at different doors in the government departments, rather than having an integrated coordination mechanism.
Fading romanticism and TTP’s emergence as a proxy
It was in 2009, that the romantic part of TTP – associated with Afghan Jihad – started to disappear and hardcore terrorist’s definition of TTP started emerging. By then we had a claritythat TTP has become a franchised organization. It was a McDonalds of terrorism in FATA and anybody could join TTP. There was no ideology as far as TTP was concerned. In different areas, they opted different ideologies. Unlike the Afghan Taliban who had a very simple ideology that get the foreign troops out of Afghanistan.
Afghan Jihad, a legitimacy tool for TTP?
TTP was using the context of Afghan Jihad for their own benefits in two ways; one that Pakistan was helping the foreign forces in Afghanistan which was against the people of Afghanistan- their infamous slogan. It is pertinent to note that Mullah Omer had given a fatwa that no Afghan Taliban would fight against Pakistani security forces and would not destabilize Pakistan. Whereas, they didn’t like to be associated with TTP but the TTP wanted to somewhat associate itself with larger part of terrorism matrix. It eventually became a power game or a money game, all means and ways were justified.
TTP’s financial life-line?
TTP did not require millions of dollars to run its affairs. The Taliban were never equipped with stinger missile or they were not carrying tanks or something. They were armed with basic weaponry which is easily available. Money coming from abroad was basically to buy their loyalties; that money was never spent on foot soldiers. The foot soldiers would they require maybe 15000 or 20000 rupees a month and they were not in thousands, but only in hundreds; financing was in a way overplayed.
What was the basic flaw in negotiations’ approach?
We had already suffered in Swat. In 2008-09, when the PPP government got elected, they said go ahead clear Swat and later they had cold feet and said stop fighting and start talking to them. We had to pay with blood and life again after the talks failed in Swat with Sufi Mohammad and party. So, the areas where we had shed blood, cleared them, they got time to prepare and fight us again on the same battleground once again. Thus, we were vary of talks in 2012-13, when the government wanted to talk to them because we had been through it. We had even been through Shikai agreement and all that. The army had lot of experience of talks. None of those agreements were honored and they benefitted in the larger canvas.The basic flaw with the talks was that when a terrorist and state sit across a table, they are equated. There is no difference. Lastly, Taliban had already been fractured. There was no unity of command in Taliban. There were fractions, supporters and detractors. Therefore, let’s say if the talks had succeeded my personal view is that leadership which was talking could not have enforced the outcome of the talks in rest of FATA.
