Imtiaz Gul
Pakistan’s decade of counter-terrorism since the assault on Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which began in May 2009, has had its fair share of ups and downs. The performance on ground – supported by empirical data ( explained in another MATRIXMAG story in this issue), testifies to more successes than failures. Failures that largely stemmed from the rusted, partially dysfunctional, politicised state institutions and their conventional outlook.
But the larger picture points to several successes, acknowledged not only from a Pakistani military or civilian expert, but by a British counter-terror official familiar with Pakistan, as well;
You have achieved a lot in the last five years if measured against the disconnect in the approaches between the military and civilian institutions. You must also keep in mind the institutional lethargy and indifference that had existed particularly in the civilian security establishment and some ministries for decades.
This assessment could have come only from a person with sound understanding of South Asia and the socio-political limitations that countries like Pakistan face when dealing with issues such as socially acceptable ideologies that fraternize with extremism and at times, terrorism. Public sympathy and official apathy for, and appeasement of non-state actors invested in Afghanistan or Kashmir was widespread. The soldier on ground, too, was confused as to whether he was fighting an enemy or a religiously devout soldier of God.
Heavy odds confronted General Ashfaq Kayani when he became the GHQ boss in November 2007. His elevation to the coveted post probably was a blessing in disguise in the context of a directionless, demoralized and confused rank and file of the army.
His experience as corps commander Corps 11 (Jan 2001- 2003) Operations (three years DG Military Operations) and Intelligence (three years as ISI chief 2004-2007) before taking over the mantle from General Pervez Musharraf, was a unique combination. This experience gave him the understanding of the situation that Pakistan was engulfed in, and the tactical wherewithal to address some of the core issues that Musharraf had ignored because of the multiple hats he wore, including his struggle for survival.
Long before entering the GHQ, General Kayani had figured out that the army under General Musharraf, had lost its focus and motivation, primarily because of confusion about the war on terror. “Is it our war?”, “Why are we fighting our own people?”, many even within the armed forces wondered.
The first objective the new COAS set for himself was to establish the focus in the garrison and train his soldier accordingly. He used to tell his visitors that an army trained to fight on the eastern front had to be reoriented to on the non-conventional front.
The second objective was to develop a simple argument for all to delegitimize the “mulla” narrative; our mission is directed only at people who are not amenable to any argument and who want their opinion accepted with the barrel of the gun, Kayani used to argue in his interaction with soldiers at the forward positions as well as garrisons across the country.Kayani essentially led a conscious campaign to take religion out of the security discourse. This helped reestablish the focus which our armed forces had lost.
The third objective was to re-motivate the soldier through a series of steps.
To start with,Kayani declared December 2007 as the month of counter-insurgency. He had a new training programme designed and implemented by the early 2008. General Kayani raised the compensation for martyred soldiers to nearly Rs.20 million besides the care package for the families of martyrs.
All this brought about a fundamental change in the institutional outlook; we are fighting a political enemy which is using religion as inspiration for its foot-soldiers. It has nothing to do with religion as such, soldiers were told.
This also meant –enabling the soldier to distinguish between jihad and terrorism. Undertaking such a bold mission was not easy at all in a context wherein Islam stood out among the primary pillars that were used to motivate the garrison and military educational institutions.
I recall a one-on-one meeting with the late General Shamim Wyne, a former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff at his office in Rawalpindi, around January 10, 2011. He was then defending the use of religion as a motivation force for the rank and file of the army. He was quite emphatic about it but became speechless for a few seconds when I asked him, “is the Pakistan army meant to defend Pakistan or Islam?”
The ultimate objective was to place higher demands on the fighters on the way to fighting what his successor General Bajwa refers to as “monsters.”
Although complete military campaign plans had existed before Kayani assumed the charge (big and small operations such as Sher Dil in Bajaur had already been under way since mid 2007), yet these ‘monsters’ i.e. non-state actors required a more comprehensive response, particularly when the ISI and GHQ concluded by late 2008 that the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had become a full-blown instrument of an unfolding proxy war against Pakistan. The ferocity of the attacks on GHQ, three regional ISI headquarters (2009-2010), on police officials and military convoys in ex FATA regions. and the terror disguised as sectarian violence across Pakistan left little doubt about the nature of this war.
It was not ideology but rather a well thought out design to occupy territory for operations, sever the Karakorum Highway and create operational hurdles for the army, using the Afghan jihad as the pretext.
All the operations since August 2008 – when the Bajaur operation Sherdil, was launched – to Swat (Rah-e-Rast,May 2009), South Waziristan (Rah-e-Nijat, October 2009), Zarb e Azb (North Waziristan, June 2014 ) as well as the current Raddul Fassad ( since 2017) – in fact gradually discredited the Mulla narrative.
A major catalyst for the final assault on the TTP was an extremely controversial speech that Sufi Muhammad (who died in July 2019 at age 94) gave at the Grassy Ground in Mingora, Swat on April 19, 2009; on the back of a flawed deal, that the Taliban had begun abusing, the military had managed to persuade Sufi to condemn violence and suicide bombings at this rally. But, to the shock of all and sundry, all Sufi did was to condemn the Constitution of Pakistan, the parliament and the Supreme Court as “un-Islamic.”
It was indeed a turning point, prompting the GHQ to wage a three-pronged operation against Mulla Fazulullah’s TTP headquarters at Peochar at the foot of Swat mountains on May 7, 2009. This reinforced General Kayani’s conviction that TTP was after a geographical piece of land to use for proxy terror, and hence the series of operations.
Once convinced of TTP’s real intent, the GHQ under General Kayani ruled out any negotiations but under General Raheel Sharif, it restarted once Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif decided to give the talks another try in January 2014. This attempt failed too; in February, the TTP proposed a 15 point plan, most of which looked like the state’s capitulation to this rag tag army. At the same time this demand-laden plan also further exposed the terror outfit’s real intent.
In hindsight, most of us are now convinced that General Kayani was right in his assessment of the terror threat emanating from the TTP and its associates operating in Mohmand Agency, Bajaur, North and South Waziristan and Swat, says Major General Ijaz Awan.
Although under General Raheel Sharif, the army finally launched the long-awaited major anti-terror campaign in North Waziristan in June 2014, yet the real shock it got was the brazen raid on Peshawar’s Army Public School (APS) in mid December the same year. Nearly 150 deaths, most of them children, jolted the entire GHQ. After subjecting most military institutions to siege and suicide bombings since 2007, the terrorists had now begun directly targeting the families of armed forces. A rude awakening indeed, that galvanized the entire military and civilian officials.
The immediate collective response to the APS attack was the 20-point National Action Plan (NAP), which despite massive shortcomings, refocused military and civilian intelligence and security outfits – the Intelligence Bureau, the ISI, police, provincial counter-terrorism departments (CTDs) on their primary roles i.e. pro-active surveillance and hunt for the terrorists as well as their abettors across the country.
Despite the shortcomings in the implementation of the NAP, in hindsight, with all that has gone on since 2014, coupled with scores of actions against Kashmir-focused non-state actors under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Action Plan, Pakistan has made a big headway in countering terrorism.
One indicator – however questionable in the eyes of critics – was the Paighame Pakistan; a 22-point message born out of consultations by more than 1800 religious scholars of all schools of thought. Launched on 16 Jan 2018, this document represented the first formal national narrative against extremism and terrorism. It emphatically rejected extremist ideologies, condemned terrorism including suicide attacks in the name of religion and underlined peaceful co-existence and tolerance. The scholars declared that declaration of combat jihad is the prerogative of the state, and that any such initiative of an individual or group shall be deemed interference in the state authority.
The proxy terror in Balochistan and former FATA territories is still claiming precious lives, yet the drastic reduction in violence in recent years testifies to the greater focus of, and coordination among, both civilian and military security establishments.
No surprise therefore, that in 2019 that the discourse within GHQ and the PM House has moved from security to economic development – an antidote to many of the country’s internal and external challenges.
