Afghanistan, after decades had a hope for peace and a better future. Yet, with each passing day, the patience is reaching its limit. Everyone is watching closely and is waiting for another civil war to erupt. Those bit optimistic are losing their minds over no progress in intra-Afghan talks. Most wonder why all players are acting so unreasonably. Nonetheless, game theory has a different story to tell; all players are acting rationally, perhaps not according to our wishes, but each one is trying to maximize its own interest. However, there could be a line of convergence.
Game theory is the process of modeling the strategic interactions between two or more players in a situation containing set rules and outcomes. While used in a number of disciplines, game theory is most notably used as an analytical tool in economics. It studies interactive decision-making, where the outcome for each participant or player depends on the actions of all. If you are a player in such a game then before choosing your course of action or strategy, you must take into account the choices of others. Though, in thinking about their choices, you must recognize that they are thinking about yours, and in turn trying to take into account your thinking about their thinking, and so on. It would seem that such sophistication about thinking must be so complex and subtle that its successful practice must remain a profound art. Nonetheless, it does offer insightful options in critical decision making.
Now analyzing Afghan conflict in the context of game theory, we would come to know that for a very long time it was seen to be as a zero-sum game – a game in which the winnings of some players must equal the losses of the others. Zero-sum games are also mentioned in political context when it is believed that options are limited, and every decision will produce both winners and losers. USA employed aggressive military strategy, and the Afghan government fully supported it in order to defeat the Taliban, but all in vain. The Taliban also thought they would be victorious soon and establish their rule again in near future; that did not materialize too. There is a clear victory on the battle field for Taliban, but establishing a government is altogether a different ball-game, as it requires international acceptance and legitimacy, which is not possible without Taliban ensuring certain freedoms and rights.
In this context, particularly in the last couple of years, the Afghan conflict seems to be transformed into non-zero sum game – a situation where one decision maker’s gain (or loss) does not necessarily result in the other decision makers’ loss (or gain). In other words, where the winnings and losses of all players do not add up to zero and everyone can have the option of a win-win game or lose-lose game. This is why, all immediate stakeholders are now trying to get involved in Afghanistan, because all seem to be losing, except the ones involved in narcotics and defense (manufacturing) sector, if Afghanistan remains volatile.
Talking of end game in Afghanistan, particularly the Afghan peace process in the context of game theory; there are two primary players in the game i.e. the Afghan government and the Taliban. Apart from these two, China, USA, Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia, Turkey and Central Asian states, are secondary players. However, Taliban does not consider the Afghan government – known as Kabul regime – to be the primary player in the game and takes the Afghan government as a US installed dummy and not the representative of the people. Taliban are proposing minus Ghani (along with his team) formula; implying that current Kabul regime has to go. Afterwards, there can be constructive intra-Afghan dialogue between Taliban and Afghan political leadership.
Now, what explains best the current picture of Afghanistan is another type of game theory – the prisoner’s dilemma. It explains why two completely rational individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. For instance, the police interrogate two suspects separately, and suggest to each that he or she should fink on the other and turn state’s evidence. If the other does not fink, then you can cut a good deal for yourself by giving evidence against the other; if the other finks and you hold out, the court deals with you harshly.
Thus, no matter what the other does, it is better for you to fink than not to fink – finking is your uniformly best or the ‘dominant’ strategy. Obviously, when both fink, both of them will be worse than they would have if both had held out; but that outcome, though jointly desirable for them, collapses in the face of their separate temptations to fink. This is exactly what is happening during the several round of talks between Afghan leadership and the Taliban.
The Taliban are not opening up much regarding the dynamics of their future role in Afghanistan, as they don’t not know what the Afghan political leadership is really up to. Similarly, the latter is also confused as how to move forward if Taliban come to power or become a dominant faction in power corridors. Both players are involved in international diplomacy, but rarely talk to each other bluntly; so the prisoner’s dilemma is precipitating more than ever. Both of them are thinking about each other’s moves; eventually neither is moving forward, because moves would be successful if both play positively. In case, one of the two plays negatively, the other will be at the losing end. Hence, both sides are exceedingly cautious and refraining from showing their cards.
On the contrary, game theory also offers a way out. The most promising type of game theory, with respect to the closure of Afghan conflict, is Nash equilibrium. It is a term used in game theory to describe an equilibrium where each players’ strategy is optimal given the strategies of all other players. A Nash Equilibrium exists when there is no unilateral profitable deviation from any of the players involved. In other words, no player in the game would take a different action as long as every other player remains the same. Nash Equilibria are self-enforcing; when players are at a Nash Equilibrium they have no desire to move because they will be worse off.
To work towards the Nash Equilibrium, the ground situation is pretty much favorable. Taliban and different factions of Afghan political leadership want a role in future governance set-up. Thus, there is a common interest which could bind them together. Though, to break the stalemate, Taliban must explicitly enunciate their governance model and related dynamics in detail, so that there is no room left for fear, uncertainty and confusion. Likewise, Afghan political leadership should also clearly state if they are willing to work with Taliban if they become dominant factor in the governance equation. Both should also discuss on what issues they can bargain and how. Both sides should perceive themselves as the same side of the coin. Both want power, legitimacy and both hate current Kabul regime. Unlike Kabul regime, both sides also fought against foreign occupation (here they have to forget what happened between them. Perhaps they already did that why they are sitting at the same table at least). This should be coupled with major confidence building measures. To start with, there could be peace and cease fire, at least in those areas where Taliban and different political factions has a certain degree of understanding and they could fuse their manpower and share the responsibilities.
In parallel, regional countries and other stakeholders should make sure that they would not accept any government in Kabul that is taken by force. This would make all factions to refrain from the use of force, as in the end they would lose international legitimacy. Moreover, if for the peaceful future of Afghanistan, Ghani has to step down, then it should not be made an issue personal vendetta and ego. The people of Afghanistan should be held supreme, rather than petty politics.
This is the perfect realization of the Nash equilibrium, but the simpler it seems on paper, the more complex it is on the ground. All Afghan factions should keep one thing in mind, that Afghans would forget the past and would accept any/all factions wholeheartedly, if they act pragmatically and work for the betterment of the country and its people. All should understand that this is the only way to legitimize oneself in the eyes of Afghans, otherwise there would always be friction within, which can go out of control anytime.
Only time will tell how things can unfold in this game, which has now become just the game of nerves. In conclusion, the people doesn’t care who rules them, they just care how they are being ruled.
The author Saddam Hussein is a Research Economist at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad
