Only time can tell if the Taliban will pay heed to the internal and international outcry on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, but they cannot keep it unaddressed for too long. Stability and peace are impossible if the natives feel unhappy and estranged.
It is August 15, 2022. The above photograph is of a market today in Kabul – antithetical to how it appeared on August 15, 2021, when the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan after a 20-year-long war. Afghanistan has undergone massive political, social, and economic developments – for the better and worse.
Four decades of war have crippled the Afghan infrastructure, compelling thousands of families to flee the country as soon as an opportunity arrives. The general sentiment is melancholy, despair, and bizarre. But also, there is stability; the scenes today on the roads do not represent chaos, but peace and tranquility, though still retaining an eerie sense of volatility.
What has gone well?
The warlords have fled the country, who, in the past, deterred even the wise decisions of the center. For instance, if the center wanted to dismiss a governor, the warlords’ consent was compulsory. The locals say that the security situation has improved in all the provinces. The internally displaced people (IDPs) have returned to their villages.
Trade has also boosted – especially the exports.
Despite the sharp decline in imports, border crossing revenue collection has remained impressive. Total revenues are expected to decrease, albeit much smaller than the contraction.
The Taliban have a more encouraging (though oversimplified) approach to the Afghan business sector than the previous administration. With the Taliban, private companies have occasionally succeeded in negotiating tax rates and other commercial concerns that directly affect them.
The de facto authority’s initiatives have significantly decreased corruption at road checkpoints and in customs (most of which have been removed). As a result, even while official tax receipts have been steady, the total burden on the private sector has decreased. Significantly reduced financial inflows, which in the past encouraged significant corruption and waste, are also helpful. However, there are indications of minor embezzlements, such as extortion of nongovernmental organizations, in government institutions under the leadership of the Taliban.
The negative effects of the economic shock and subsequent adjustment have been disproportionately felt at the upper end of the Afghan income scale, which benefited most from corruption, with smaller percentage reductions in incomes at the lower end due to less widespread corruption and the aid cutoff.
Because it is unable to print new Afghani banknotes or to saturate the country with dollars (limited to U.N. cash shipments), and since the withdrawals from banks are restricted to prevent bank failure, the Taliban administration has generally maintained a responsible macroeconomic and monetary stance.
But the Taliban have also demonstrated incompetence
They lack transparency on budget expenditures, perhaps trying to mask irregularities or, more likely, the allocation of large amounts of funds to the security sector and other Taliban priorities.
Even though not executed in a prolific manner, attempts to regulate the foreign exchange market and orders to refrain from using foreign money reveal a lack of knowledge about how markets work and the benefits that the free market brings to Afghanistan.
It is unclear whether the Taliban will be able to maintain roads and other necessary infrastructure better than the previous government, let alone oversee significant new infrastructure investments. The large increases in coal and other mineral exports may further deteriorate Afghanistan’s crumbling roads – not to mention, the negative effects of mining on the environment and society.
The Taliban’s ideology stands in the way of prudent financial management. If their recently declared ban on opium is put into effect, it will further debilitate the Afghan economy and threaten the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of rural residents – something the nation cannot afford. The implementation of the ban is still uncertain.
By limiting the participation of more than half of the population in the economy, Taliban limitations on girls’ education and women’s positions in the workforce would have severe longer-term economic effects.
The United States claims that the Taliban are not taking the Doha Agreement seriously, which stated that the Taliban would tackle terrorist elements against other countries operating on Afghan soil.
Especially the recent killing of Al Zawahiri poses a serious question mark on their capacity (as well as the intent) to curtail radical elements. In a way, it has brought a bad name to the Taliban government, and it seems that the United States would not sit still. It would stand its ground, though not with the same magnitude, in Afghanistan and go for who is next in Al Qaeda leadership – which might irk the Taliban, worsening the slump between Washington and Kabul.
Secondly, the presence of other banned outfits like the Islamic State, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) makes Afghanistan seem like a preferred haven for the terrorists. And, the de facto Afghan rulers appear feeble in both threshold and resolution to deal with the extremist groups.
The Taliban find themselves in multifaceted perils today: ranging from non-recognition and economic sanctions to sabotaged infrastructure and dismay of their people due to the ideologically-driven decisions of the group (such as delaying the reopening of girls’ schools from grade 6-12 and restricting the sphere of mobility for women). The Taliban do not have an excuse for that, not even in the light of Islamic Shariah. Keeping aside everything else, the Taliban needs to take small but meaningful steps to create a wave of cheer and palatability at home. Reopening girls’ schools and adopting some neutrality in similar matters could reopen avenues of acceptance and help them achieve clout in the international arena. Besides, they need to prioritize the appointment of technocrats in the cabinet – to address the challenges in the economy and governance.
Forming an inclusive government is yet another, though giant, step towards attaining stability. A multiethnic nation like Afghanistan should be led by a government representing all ethnicities and geographical territories.
And most important, they need to unlearn patterns of the past. Upsetting the younger generation, especially the girls, by taking drastic measures of banning education and freedom of expression would only make the Taliban lose further ground.
Only time can tell if the Taliban will pay heed to the internal and international outcry on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, but they cannot keep it unaddressed for too long. Stability and peace are impossible if the natives feel unhappy and estranged.
The plea for equal opportunities, fulfilling livelihood, civil liberties, and education for all is from their people, not the international community: the Taliban need to get rid of their tunnel vision and look beyond – with a humane eye.
