Mian Sanaullah
The Talks
There were reports that the deal between the Taliban and the US has surmounted the critical stage and was near ready for signature. Already, the parties had initialed its text and a copy of it was shown to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in Kabul by US negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad. The hopes were high that a difficult and challenging first step had been successfully taken. The US had to accept the Taliban’s primary conditions of direct talks with them and removal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. In this process, the US had to sideline its Afghan allies, consult China, Russia, Iran, India, and its allies in NATO, and enlist Pakistan’s assistance to use its influence to facilitate contacts with the Taliban. On their part, the Taliban also had to do plenty of in-house consultations and cajoling. The peace deal progressed slowly over nine rounds of tough negotiations spread over eleven months, a herculean effort.
It was incredibly shocking then, the tweet by US President Donald Trump, rejecting the deal. The rejection announcement defied conventional diplomatic norms, a staple of the oft-tweeting president.
In Pakistan, foreign ministers from China, Afghanistan and Pakistan held the third round of a trilateral consultation the same day. Their meeting focused on political relations, the Afghan peace process, and security cooperation, etc. They condemned the recent terrorist attacks in Kabul, Konduz, Baghlan and Farah, and reiterated their support for a politically negotiated settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan. In this regard, they took note of the talks between the US and the Taliban. They expressed hope that intra-Afghan negotiations including direct negotiations between the Kabul and the Taliban would begin soon, and lead to full cessation of violence. They had no clue then what was cooking up in Trump’s mind, though controversial reports had started dribbling in media about the text of thedeal.
The one year of war in Afghanistan has caused death and material destruction beyond its borders. It was hoped that the intended deal would at least lead to the dismantling of proxy wars, draining of feeding channels of international terror outfits like Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaida (AQ), and may bring investments to kick-start the stalled mega projects of energy, infrastructure and mining. With the finalization of the drawdown schedule of US forces, the Taliban would have no justification to refuse face-to-face talks with Ghani’s government, and together with other Afghan groups, would agree on an inclusive power-sharing formula in the second round to be held in Norway.
Cognizant of the Taliban’s past, almost all stakeholders indulged in self-denials for peace; they felt that the recent spurt of violence and attacks by the Taliban on the civilian population was a tactical move to enhance their bargaining position and would soon end. In contrast, the Taliban did not trust the Americans, and wanted to establish legitimacy through their reach and capacity. At the same time it was a clearly a threatening message to other Afghans critical of the Taliban-US peace deal. Also, the Taliban did not want to discourage their local commanders who believed that they were winning against US forces. Political analyst Hashim Wahdatyar, director at the Institute of Current World Affairs in Washington, DC, told Al Jazeera, “The civilians have been targeted to show visibilities and the group’s strength to show to the international community that they cannot be defeated.”
Tweeter-in-Chief
Two days before the 9/11 anniversary Trump suddenly tweeted cancellation of both the peace negotiations and secret meetings with Ghani and Taliban negotiator Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. Trump gave his own explanation but no one knows for sure what actually prompted him to destroy an agreement that would have fulfilled his election promise. No doubt the Taliban had assumed an unassailable position vis-à-visother Afghan groups because of their elevation from an insurgent group to a counterpart in negotiations. But claiming responsibility for two blasts, first on September 2 and second on September 5, killing 28 persons was a bad political move on their part.
Ghani questioned the rationale of making peace with a group that is still killing innocent people as “meaningless.” In any other country, the killing of 28 persons in a week would be considered tragic enough to warrant cancelation of any agreement no matter how ready it were to be signed. A United Nations report released earlier this year said that 2018 saw the highest number of civilians killed in Afghanistan’s war than any other year.
Therefore, it is hard to esteem Trump’s reasoning in his tweet as the critical input for his sudden decision. He never cared much about Ghani and the massive killing spree in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Khalilzad, who has publically reported “steady progress on aspects of the framework for ending the Afghan war”, admitted “the devil is always in the details of the deal.”
Trumpgreatly values his unpredictable personality, as he feels it deters his interlocutors from estimating his thought trail. From subsequent developments it appears that the cancellation decision was not impulsive, but a calculated move to discard a flawed deal, and to stitch the widening rift in his administration agitated by details of the controversial deal. Jeff Stacey, a former US State Department official, told Al Jazeera that although Trump’s comments were unexpected, theyshowed a serious approach by a president who has been “very unpredictable” and inconsistent in regards to Afghan policy.
With little diplomatic success in three years, this great dealmaker was ready to mainstream the Taliban in the proposed power matrix in Kabul but the cost turned out to be too high. His deal making trait swayed him to retreat and refocus on his partners in Afghanistan and domestically side with those who can deliver some success story in the foreign policy domain. This explains why he sought a resignation from National Security Advisor Ambassador John Bolton. His deal making habit strengthened by his three-year experience as President made him realize the limit of American power; no hawk could deliver a successful deal in foreign policy domain, so dispense with hawks and find a substitute who can work with him without poking his illusion that he is the all-wise leader in full control. No wonder that many Americans saw Bolton’s departure as a signal of a shift in Trump’s foreign-policy, i.e., turning away from conflict toward diplomacy (Thomas Wright, The Brookings Institution, and September 11,2019).
Taliban Conundrum
The Taliban have moved from criticizing the cancellation to continuation of the dialogue. The Taliban spokesman said exchanges were still being made through emails and WhatsApp, though “there is no formal contact.” Overcoming their initial shock and assertion that the decision would “harm America more than anyone else’’, the Taliban have made this pragmatic shift in their strategy. The Taliban know that a stalemate will dent their newly acquired legitimacy.
Rushing out to Russia did not prove productive for the Taliban; Moscow just called for resumption of the negotiations. Trump is not in an obliging mood. He believes that Taliban have never been hit harder than they are being hit right now. He believes they are now repenting and hoping for a restart of the peace negotiations. As stated earlier, it is likely that this snub has the added benefit of assuaging domestic concerns after leaks that the secret Ghani meeting was to be held with Trump at Camp David.
Many Afghans fear more violence and mayhem if both sides do not engage in talks. They expect US aerial attacks and reaction from the Taliban, as well as stepped up offensive and counter offensive moves between the Taliban and the Afghan forces. Tensions and power snatching in this process would result in a new bloodbath for Afghans and a fresh wave of killings inPakistan.
Nevertheless, the deal cancellation is a huge disaster for the Taliban, a boom for a beleaguered Ghani, a new leaf of hope for India to play relevant moves in Afghanistan, and bad for Pakistan and Iran.
The Path Forward
In all likelihood, Trump would come back to resume the negotiation with Taliban as the new pivot from conflict to diplomacy sits well with plans to show off a success story before the presidential elections. In the meanwhile, he will indulge in sabre rattling to put pressure on the Taliban. Already he has boasted that “they will never have seen anything like what will happen to them”. He would ensure that the presidential election in Afghanistan takes place as scheduled and Ghani is re-elected. Former Ambassador Fauzia Mazhar Sana feels that Trump would encourage resumption of negotiation with the Taliban by end October/November. This move would show American voters closer to the primaries that he is serious about his intention to bring back troops. A partial withdrawal also cannot be ruledout.
Many political analysts think that major conflicts with the Taliban have since been smoothened to the extent where the text was near signing; Trump may not rule out a breakthrough after a stall. His emphasis would then be to get a better deal. It would be difficult as a renewed fresh mandate would strengthen Ghani in the Norway talks. Only a very low turnout and disputed election, similar to past votes, will weaken his hand. Such a situation will plunge Afghanistan into a spate of despondency and free-for-all.
Trump would then try that the Taliban get a share in power proportionate to their actual strength among the Pashtun population. The Taliban would resist, making the Norway round difficult to sustain. The Taliban have proven their strength on the ground, and they would expect to be accommodated as formidable partners in the new government. Another difficult question is who would ensure the Taliban would give due and agreed space to other Pashtuns. If the deal comes through and all these obstacles are managed, it will still only be the first step in the long haul to normalize Afghanistan.
Depending on the fate of American operations, Pakistan’s position for America would fluctuate from critical friend to an indifferent ally. Similarly, the swing in Pak-US relations would move from appreciation to calls for domore.
The Afghan peace process primarily hinges on Trump and prospects of his re-election. The Taliban do not have the capacity to take over Kabul militarily. Russia, China, Tajikistan, and Iran wield influence in Afghanistan. Other entities, which can either facilitate or act as spoilers include India, some Arab countries, and global terror outfits.
Deal and no deal, peace is not likely to return soon in Afghanistan. Afghan elites still have to learn that the common Afghan is no less human than them and his needs are as essential as theirs. If peace and stability are truly the aims, the existing network of proxies will have to be dismantled jointly by all. In verifiable action, all have to prove that they have no favorite in Afghanistan, and its sovereignty is second to none.
