Matrix Media recently interviewed Adam Weinstein of the Quincy Institute, Washington, who has also served as a Marine in Afghanistan. He spoke about the changing geopolitical dynamics between China and the US and how Pakistan is struggling to maintain a neutral stance with the two countries.
The US-Pakistan relationship seems to have been suffering from various setbacks and has been at a stalemate, particularly after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. Can this relationship bounce back from when President Asif Ali Zardari was in power?
Weinstein: Well, I guess it depends on what you mean by bounce back, as I would say we bounce forward because going back to the times of Zardari would not be advisable. We need to establish a robust relationship not because of the war in Afghanistan or security issues but because of a genuine recognition of our mutual importance to one another.
When President Biden released his national security strategy, some Pakistani friends here told me they felt slighted that Pakistan hadn’t been listed in the strategy, making it less relevant.
And I said, consider it an opportunity that Pakistan’s not listed in the national security strategy as it won’t be included for the reasons Pakistan wants it to be, I promise you that.
And so, it’s not always a good thing to be in the national security strategy, and by that, I mean that we need to move away from this securitized relationship and move towards a broader one. But of course, that’s difficult right now because Pakistan’s facing serious security challenges.
Q. Other than security threats and challenges, what are the real bottlenecks in the relationship between the US and Pakistan?
Weinstein: I think there’s a creativity deficit. It’s difficult for US diplomats to navigate the electoral politics on one end and the establishment on the other end of the spectrum and walk the tightrope between those two centers of power.
Ultimately, the biggest challenge remains a deficit of creativity on both sides, that the relationship can be more than just discussing F-16s or terrorism in Waziristan. We can instead talk about trade, people-to-people exchanges, and educational programs. We can work together on climate change.
Also, a recognition that Pakistan in 2050 might be the third most populous country in the world. It already has over 200 million people and is projected to be number three. There is an inherent importance to that. The current development status of Pakistan, is what the US should be really concerned about.
Q. What about the India factor as far as the Pakistan-US relationship is concerned? Do you think that is also a bottleneck because of the strategic nature that now binds both the United States and India?
Weinstein: Well, you hit the nail on the head with that one because it is strategic. I believe the Indo-Pacific strategy is a transactional relationship based on having this sort of coalition to contain China, and is not a threat to Pakistan.
Sure, the US will use language like, we have shared values with India and so on, but the reality is that it’s a very transactional relationship.
Another interesting point is that after the war in Ukraine kicked off, there were people in Washington, maybe not in the government, but outside of government in the policy community, who were shocked that India took an independent stance by stating that they will keep their relations with Russia.
This was a real wake-up call reminding us that this relationship is not about values or a coalition, but rather a very narrow transactional alliance.
And I think it would benefit Pakistan if they stopped worrying so much about India. I know that’s easy for me to say, but I think Pakistan has its value apart from India and needs to decouple itself from India when thinking about Pakistan-US relations.
Q. The other issue is the soft power that India deploys abroad in its relationship with Europe, with the United States, and this is what it apparently has used to also keep Pakistan at bay, hasn’t it?
Weinstein: Yes, to some degree, but Pakistan then needs to get better at self-power. India is good at soft power, and that has some advantages. There’s a massive Indian diaspora of non-resident Indians who live in the US and a large Indian American population that has been friendly towards India, and they have been incredible ambassadors for India.
The Pakistani American diaspora is only now becoming involved in policy debates as previously wasn’t a part of the conversation in Washington. That’s changing. Also, just the fact that India has had ITX ports for so many years and is close to the tech industry in California, in Silicon Valley, that’s been a real value add. You know, many of these tech CEOs that are now big names, spent time in India when they were young, and that’s because India made it easy for them to visit. So, these are some ways, Pakistan, could also adopt and replicate if it chose to.
Q. The other factor is the Pakistan-China relationship, which seems very strong, touted as deeper-than the Indian Ocean and higher than the Himalayas. But does this relationship also cast any shadow on the US approaching Pakistan with open arms?
Weinstein: The limitation is that sometimes there are areas within Pakistan, such as infrastructure development, where even from the US perspective, that’s China’s domain, and we don’t want to be a part of it. In my personal opinion, that’s a lost opportunity for the United States. But I think the US understands that Pakistan is in a position where it will seek a close relationship with China and the US.
The chief of Army, Gen. Bajwa, made that very clear, as did most of the Pakistani leaders elected in the military, so I don’t think that’s a problem for the US. However, I do feel that the China-Pakistan relationship is in trouble right now due to issues with CPEC and the security of Chinese workers inside Pakistan.
I also don’t believe that a negative China-Pakistan relationship is necessarily in the best interest of the US.
Q. We constantly hear what the Chinese claim is false propaganda about their actions abroad, including in Pakistan and Africa, being accused of debt-trap diplomacy and occasionally referred to as new economic imperialism. However, China has its own way of responding, claiming that they haven’t bombed any countries or sent any missiles there but is merely trying to create new infrastructure. How do we overcome this?
Weinstein: I think some of the development China does in Africa and even in Pakistan is, you know, perhaps more in the interest of China than in the recipient countries. But at the same time, one can’t deny that the infrastructure that China has created, improved the lives of Pakistanis and those in developing countries. You know, most Pakistani homes have electricity and a metro system because of China, so these are clear examples.
The US should not feel threatened by it, but if it is, it needs to offer an alternative. Washington cannot go around asking recipient countries; why they are accepting China? Knowing very well that it is because of infrastructure aid, and Washington doesn’t have an alternative for it.
Of course, these countries in the global south are going to then take advantage of what China has to offer.
Q. Recently, the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, met US Foreign Secretary, Blinken at the Munich Conference. And thereafter, he stated that the US has a misguided perception of China. He also mentioned the self-serving ness or self-righteousness, protectionism, and unilateralism, which the US deploys when mentioning China. Do you think it’s the right characterization of how the US looks at China?
Weinstein: Well, the US does engage in unilateralism. That’s undeniable. I think China and the US have a misconception about one another. China says some very negative things about the US on the world stage that I don’t think are necessarily true, and so does Washington about China.
I think China is a reality that Washington has to accept in the sense that it’s a country of a billion people, and its rise to some degree is inevitable. Ultimately, I think China’s destiny is going to be most impacted by China, not the US.
An example of this, I would argue, is that they mismanaged the covid epidemic, which cost them their economy and reputation. That was self-inflicted by China rather than US tariffs or external factors. I think what’s important for both countries is to look for as many avenues in which they can cooperate, or at least not disrupt one another as possible.
Q. Would you agree that there is a sort of geopolitical exceptionalism that we see in the policy of the United States? When it’s talking about the human rights violations in China and at the same time, human rights violations in India? As there hasn’t been much mention of what has been happening to the more than 25% of religious minorities in India, including Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs, whereas now and then, we hear a lot about human rights violations or reported human rights violations in the Western Xinjiang province.
Weinstein: I think the US tends to do this regarding human rights in general. For example, we will openly criticize Iran’s regime for human rights violations, but are very hesitant to say things about Saudi Arabia, and at times are even complicit in their human rights violations, taking Yemen as an example. That’s just one example outside of China.
I believe what China has done in Xinjiang is unconscionable, and I’ll be clear about that. But I think it’s also true that the US at times has not taken a hard enough stance about what is happening in Kashmir and what’s happening to Indian-Muslims throughout the country.
It’s disturbing to see the largest democracy in the world move in a right-wing direction that is stripping rights away from its biggest religious minority, the Muslim population. The US should be more consistent, and call out all human rights violations.
Q. And lastly, to what extent can Afghanistan be the common denominator as far as the United States, China, Pakistan, and Russia are?
Weinstein: There’s a convergence of interest in Afghanistan. All these countries, China, Russia, the US, India, and Pakistan, face a threat from the rise of ISKP from whatever freedom of movement Al-Qaeda has. For now, TTP is only a threat perhaps to Pakistan, but it has the potential to be a transnational threat. And TTP has a close relationship with Al-Qaeda historically, so this should be of concern to the US. There’s also ETIM, which is a worry for China. All of these groups are interrelated in some way.
Q. What is your view, as a researcher, having lived in Afghanistan, on these terrorist groups? Do they hope to capture these countries by pricking this country like the TTP is doing in Pakistan?
Weinstein: Well, I’m conflicted about this issue because sometimes I think, why do we spend so much time talking about these groups?
You could say that the most existential threat to Pakistan is not terrorism but the economy. These terrorist groups have the potential to erode morale in society. For example, a TTP attack in Karachi only killed a few police officers. Now, in the grand scheme of things, that’s a very low casualty, obviously not for their families, but it deters foreign investment and people from coming to Pakistan.
The TTP has been quite shrewd in targeting the police. This group will not elicit the mass sympathy of the country, as opposed if they target children or civilians.
I think they learned from the APS attack what their limits are. So, they are very focused on the police, with a clear message to Pakistan that your government can’t control us. Pakistan and Afghanistan are two different countries, so we cannot say that TTP can take over Pakistan, but they can demoralize Pakistani society.
Q. If the objective of this proxy group is to prevent foreign investment and make this country appear like a volatile, dangerous country, isn’t that then translated into an existential threat?
Weinstein: It may be a slow-moving existential threat, but the primary dysfunction, stopping foreign investment and internal development, is not the security situation but the lack of ease of conducting business. There is no productive industry right now, and cases regarding corruption and fraud are taken lightly in Pakistan. So, one wonders what exactly is an existential threat to Pakistan.
There is a lack of economic development and a rapidly growing population, which is an existential threat. Even, in terms of climate resiliency, the lack of development planning has resulted in human loss catastrophe. Now I’m not excusing the international community from that either. However, this mindset has to change, and I worry that sometimes Pakistani elites use insecurity as an excuse for not making the kinds of changes that the IMF has demanded.
While Pakistan does face a unique terrorism situation, and it has been a victim of terrorism. I’m very sympathetic to that. But also, the US has tens of thousands of gun violence deaths every year and mass shootings. Countries like Latin America and Brazil have high insecurity, yet they have managed to develop and attract investment. So, Pakistan can follow the same approach.
Pakistan needs to prioritize developing its economy. You can’t bring the country to a standstill and put development on hold while you try to resolve a terrorism issue that could last for years.
