Aisha Saeed
Less than 18 months after a New York Times’ article questioned India’s ability to challenge China following the events around the February 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis versus Pakistan, more doubts surround the discourse around the Indo-Sino standoff in eastern Ladakh. Many in the US-aligned West see India as a potential bulwark against an expansionist China but the Galwan valley face-off has once again raised questions on India’s ability to serve as a shield for US’s geo-strategic interests in Asia.
What does India’s behavior in this crisis reveal? How will that affect Indo-US ties and the balance of security in the region going forward?
A disputed border with a neighbor and hegemonic design seem like a perfect recipe for turning a skirmish into a full blown war. Since 1962, the Galwan Valley has been a flashpoint in Sino-Indian conflicts and the year 2020 is no different. The Sino-Indian line of actual control (LAC) can be divided into Western (Tibet and Ladakh) , Central ( Tibet with Himachal and Uttar Pardesh) and Eastern sections ( East of Bhutan). The Western section has witnessed maximum transgressions of troops and largely patrol areas based on mere perceptions.
China claims the area up to Galwan valley in Eastern Ladakh and these preemptive actions may have been triggered by the recent developments in the area by India ( construction of airbases DaulatBeg/ Fuckche and the 255 km road to serve them) . It is important to note that in Demochok area, where NH-219 passes close to LAC, is where India enjoys terrain advantage and poses a threat to the Chinese base located nearby.
India’s unilateral annexation of the Indian-administered Kashmir on August 5 as well as that of the Ladakh region, continuous development and up-gradation of communication and aggressive posturing (preparation of advance landing ground) may have been the possible trigger points of the recent clash.
Lack of official communication from the Chinese side during the standoff may indicate that the Chinese have achieved the strategic objective of retaining the piece of land but do not want to beat the drums of victory. It has silently eliminated all possible ground threats towards Tibet and the NH-219.
“ If you wait by the river long enough, the bodies of your enemies will float by “ – Sun Tzu- Art of War.
India’s Pakistan-centric military strategy has created enough void in response mechanism and allowed the Chinese military to take advantage and make a check-mate move. At the strategic level, it has surprised India to very limited response-centric options i.e rushing troops and equipment to reinforce the defeated troops. At operational and tactical level, India has a bloody nose, bodies of slain soldiers, and a 60 square km area with no response options. China and the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) have exposed the shortcomings of the Indian government and its military to contain the larger enemy and given it a realistic view of a two front war.
A calculated aggressive move by the PLA has greater military implications for the Indian military as the standoff has occurred in an area that is strategically important for India. If the situation escalates, technologically and financially superior China is likely to take full advantage of advanced communication infrastructure and may take Shyok and Nubra Valleys. Resultantly, land route to Siachen may be threatened and cost of war increased manifold for financially weak Indian economy to handle the aftermath.
India stands at a precarious position diplomatically as no world power has yet intervened in the Ladakh standoff. Nor have they called on India to reverse its October 2019 decisions of declaring Kashmir and Ladakh its union territories. Yet, its disputes with Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh and China don’t put into a comfortable position either.
However, the Ladakh standoff presents a unique opportunity to forcefully raise the Kashmir issue at international fora. Exterior diplomatic maneuvers to coerce opinion of SARRC members to support the Kashmir cause and aggressive pestering of force along LOC and LAC may increase the pressure on India.
But the question remains- can the Ladakh standoffs escalate to a full scale war? Military analysts opine that it has the potential to escalate to a limited war. It may, however turn into a replay of the 1962 fiasco. The Indian army may have the advantage of high ground (western section) in four areas but loss of strategically important places will make the defense untenable. The PLA will not give the control of the areas it has captured and ensure dominance over the area in the coming times.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative caused great discomfort to the US and India as it undermines the Indo-US perspective of dominance and security in South Asia. They view Beijing as the biggest stumbling block in their way. China on the other hand is increasingly asserting itself as a power to reckon with. Its mantra of establishing dominance, nevertheless, has thus far been through its economic expansion and culture as opposed to using its military might. The Galwan valley moves is a clear departure from that.
This also represents yet another opportunity to consolidate its enduring partnership with China, which remains an extremely dependable “all weather” ally.
The implications of the Galwan Valley standoff may have wider implications for India. Its final settlement will either be decided through escalation or dialogue. The circumstance thus far point to the latter option as India has failed in convincingly countering the Chinese narrative and its actions in eastern Ladakh.
Aisha Saeed is an independent analyst on media and foreign policy of Pakistan. She tweets @MsAishaK.
